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THE NEED FOR A HISTORICAL EXCEPTION TO 
GRAND JURY SECRECY IN THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Daniel Aronsohn* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that, on March 16, 44 B.C., just after the assassination of 
Julius Caesar, a group of investigators interviewed the Roman 
senators. Imagine that those investigators heard from all relevant 
players in an attempt to unravel the conspiracy. Those interviews were 
conducted promptly and thoroughly to ensure that the senators’ 
recollections were as clear as possible. 
Imagine, too, that the transcripts of those interviews were locked 
away, perfectly preserved to the present day. Those transcripts would 
be invaluable resources. They would be firsthand, almost 
contemporaneous accounts of a momentous historical event that 
remains cloaked in uncertainty. Access to those transcripts may 
demystify the conspiracy to kill Julius Caesar by identifying 
conspirators, exposing plans, and clarifying motives. Imagine, though, 
that those transcripts were rendered inaccessible. 
Although no transcripts regarding Caesar’s assassination are 
known to exist, grand jury records held today at the National Archives 
provide comparable and contemporaneous insight into similarly 
momentous events in history. Access to these records is an ongoing 
centerpiece of litigation, as some courts have denied the petitions of 
historians and scholars for access to grand jury materials that may 
provide the only answers to mysteries surrounding critical events such 
as Watergate and World War II.1 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor 
Levenson for her invaluable support in writing this Note and for teaching me to “love the law.” I 
am so grateful. I would also like to thank my mom, dad, and brother for always believing in me. 
Finally, I would like to thank the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their help 
in the writing process. 
 1. See infra Part III. 
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A grand jury serves two principal functions in the criminal justice 
system: investigative and accusatorial.2 Where the perpetrator of a 
crime is apparent, a grand jury adheres only to the latter function.3 
Where there is suspicion of a crime, however, and questions remain as 
to the identities or roles of those involved, a prosecutor may convene 
a grand jury to investigate those questions.4 With nearly unfettered 
investigatory powers, a grand jury has access to a plethora of 
information and may conduct a sweeping inquiry.5 As a result, one 
cannot underestimate the wealth of information uncovered before a 
grand jury. 
Long hailed as the axiomatic complement to the grand jury is the 
rule of secrecy.6 As a general matter, what occurs in a grand jury room 
must remain confidential.7 The general rule of secrecy is indefinite, so 
it may persist long past the existence of the grand jury itself.8 
The rule of secrecy often poses only a nominal barrier to 
information, as there are several exceptions by which courts may 
authorize disclosure of grand jury materials.9 Grand jury materials 
come to light, for instance, through a trial brought against the indicted 
individual.10 Alternatively, those who testify before the grand jury are 
not bound by the rule of secrecy and may therefore disclose any 
information they wish.11 
A significant challenge arises, though, where a grand jury chooses 
not to indict an individual while the veil of secrecy remains 
indefinitely intact. In a high-profile grand jury investigation, silence is 
 
 2. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343–44 (1974) (explaining that a grand jury 
investigation is not an issue of guilt but rather an issue of “whether a crime has been committed 
and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person”). 
 3.  See id. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 515; see also SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: 
A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.5 (2d ed. 2019). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (“As a necessary 
consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush.”); Calandra, 
414 U.S. at 343 (explaining that the grand jury “may determine alone the course of its inquiry”); 
United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913, 915–16 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Mere suspicion that a crime is 
being committed is sufficient reason for a grand jury to issue a subpoena.”).  
 6. See John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The justification for 
grand jury secrecy inheres in the nature of the proceeding.”). 
 7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
 8. See id.; see also, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 
(1979) (“Thus, the interests in grand jury secrecy, although reduced, are not eliminated merely 
because the grand jury has ended its activities.”). 
 9. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3). 
 10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E). 
 11. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
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pervasive. Grand jury witnesses may be reticent to speak publicly 
about their testimony, whether due to their own involvement in the 
crime or unwillingness to admit their cooperation with the 
investigative body. Grand jurors may likewise prefer anonymity due 
to fear of intimidation or undesired media attention. With nobody 
willing to speak, and with the veil of secrecy still upheld, the nature of 
the grand jury’s investigation is ever unknown. 
Because of the contemporaneous fear or danger that may 
surround major historical events, grand jurors may be the only people 
to hear the story. Events remain shrouded in uncertainty. Gaps in 
history persist, and the stories die along with the grand jurors, the 
witnesses, and the subjects of the investigation. The only answers lie 
in the grand jury records. 
As this Note expounds, the passage of time dispels the 
fundamental purposes of grand jury secrecy, and the treasure trove of 
information uncovered by a grand jury remains inaccessible.12 This 
quandary is a disservice to historians and, more broadly, the American 
public. Grand jury information can prove valuable in bringing clarity 
to history and furthering necessary discussions about, among many 
other things, government, the press, and war.13 
This Note proposes a codified historical exception to grand jury 
secrecy as an addition to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). In 
exploring the purposes of secrecy as well as the interests in disclosure, 
this Note concludes that a historical exception meritoriously serves to 
protect the grand jury and its processes while simultaneously making 
significant contributions to scholarship. 
Part II of this Note will provide background information on the 
grand jury and the general rule of secrecy. Part III will discuss the 
existing framework for disclosure of grand jury materials under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and courts’ differing 
approaches on how to interpret the rule. Finally, Part IV will set forth 
a proposed historical exception and will address three principal 
reasons that a legislative exception is the best approach to enhancing 
the historical record without jeopardizing the important interests 
protected by the veil of secrecy. 
 
 12. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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II.  THE GRAND JURY AND THE TRADITION OF SECRECY 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to a grand jury14 in 
felony prosecutions.15 Adopted by American colonists, the grand jury 
serves an intermediary role between the accused and the prosecution, 
so it is often considered the guardian against oppressive government 
and the guarantor of fair criminal process.16 It comprises anywhere 
from sixteen to twenty-three members17 and has two principal 
functions: investigative and accusatorial.18 
With respect to its investigatory function, a grand jury’s objective 
is to unravel the mystery surrounding a potential crime.19 Generally 
unbounded by conventional restrictions such as the rules of 
evidence,20 a grand jury is afforded great flexibility in pursuing that 
objective.21 The Supreme Court explained the relatively unbounded 
nature of a grand jury’s investigation thus: 
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and 
inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited 
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the 
probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any 
 
 14. The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 15. The Fifth Amendment requires indictment by a grand jury for crimes punishable by death 
or for crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a); see also 
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 (1958) (“[A]n ‘infamous crime’ within the meaning of 
the Amendment is one punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary . . . [and] imprisonment in a 
penitentiary can be imposed only if a crime is subject to imprisonment exceeding one year.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Although there are some 
exceptions to the general rule requiring a grand jury in felony prosecutions, those exceptions are 
not pertinent to this paper. 
 16. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951) (“[T]he most valuable function of the 
grand jury (has been) not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the 
prosecutor and the accused . . . .” (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906))). 
 17. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a). 
 18. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343–44 (1974) (explaining that a grand jury 
investigation is not an issue of guilt but rather an issue of “whether a crime has been committed 
and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person”). 
 19. Id. at 344 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962)). 
 20. Principles of relevance and materiality are stretched to their limits in the course of a grand 
jury investigation. See People v. Allen, 103 N.E.2d 92, 96–97 (Ill. 1951) (“In litigated cases, 
materiality can be fixed with a relatively high degree of precision . . . . No standard of comparable 
certainty exists with respect to an inquiry by a grand jury.”). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (“As a necessary 
consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush.”); Calandra, 
414 U.S. at 343 (explaining that the grand jury “may determine alone the course of its inquiry”); 
United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913, 915–16 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Mere suspicion that a crime is 
being committed is sufficient reason for a grand jury to issue a subpoena.”). 
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particular individual will be found properly subject to an 
accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of 
the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be 
one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand 
jury’s labors, not at the beginning.22 
The grand jury’s primary evidentiary tool is the power to issue 
subpoenas.23 It is by way of the subpoena power that a grand jury will 
compel the production of documents and witness testimony in an 
attempt to uncover facts and assess criminality.24 
Axiomatic to the grand jury investigation is the rule of secrecy.25 
This longstanding rule, explored below, is vital to the administration 
of the grand jury and the protection of those within the shadow of its 
inquiry. 
A.  The History of Grand Jury Secrecy 
The early foundations of grand jury secrecy are traceable to 
twelfth-century England under King Henry II.26 The King gathered a 
twelve-member body that surreptitiously informed him of those who 
had violated the law, thereby giving the local sheriff an opportunity to 
capture the accused prior to an escape.27 Over the course of several 
centuries, the English grand jury evolved to gain independence from 
the monarch while maintaining the general rule of secrecy in its 
proceedings.28 
In the seventeenth century, American colonists brought much of 
the English legal system to the new world, including the grand jury.29 
Colonists roundly embraced the grand jury and its veil of secrecy.30 
 
 22. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (citing Hendricks v. United States, 223 
U.S. 178, 184 (1912)). 
 23. A grand jury has the power to issue two types of subpoenas: ad testificandum and duces 
tecum. These subpoenas compel witness testimony and document production, respectively. 
BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 4, § 8.2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The justification for 
grand jury secrecy inheres in the nature of the proceeding.”). 
 26. In 1166, King Henry II established a “system of local informers” to notify him of criminal 
activity within his kingdom. Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: 
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). 
 27. Id. 
 28. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Kadish, supra note 26, at 6; see also id. (“[T]he English tradition of the grand jury was 
well established in the American colonies long before the American Revolution.”). 
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Following the conclusion of the American Revolution, the new 
government ratified the Constitution in 178831 and, in 1791, codified 
the requirement of a grand jury in the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of 
Rights.32 Despite no express reference to secrecy, the Grand Jury 
Clause was said to imply it.33 For the next century and a half, 
American courts began to develop and fortify common law 
surrounding the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.34 
In 1946, the Supreme Court established the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure35 and, within them, the general rule of grand jury 
secrecy.36 Through several amendments to the Rules by both Congress 
and the Supreme Court, the principle of secrecy has endured.37 
The sanctity of grand jury secrecy remains evident today. For 
example, the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors devotes a relatively 
substantial section to secrecy.38 Moreover, grand jurors must take an 
oath39 that binds them to the “strict obligation of secrecy.”40 And 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides a list of 
 
 31. Creating the United States: Convention and Ratification, LIBRARY OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/convention-and-ratification.html (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 32. Kadish, supra note 26, at 12. 
 33. Id. at 16; see also United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343, 346 (N.D.N.Y. 1881) (“[P]ublic 
policy would not permit the transaction before a grand jury to be disclosed . . . .”); United States v. 
Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1186, 1189 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (“[T]he sentiments expressed by jurors, and the 
facts disclosed by witnesses to them, are secrets . . . .”). 
 34. See, e.g., United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Del. 1950) (“[A]ll 
proceedings before the Grand Jury should remain secret unless extraordinary circumstances are 
present . . . .”); United States v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D.D.C. 1939) (“[T]he oath 
taken by the grand jurors . . . is not limited by time or circumstance. It is a lasting obligation binding 
all who have served as grand jurors.”); United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 
(D.R.I. 1917) (“Secrecy is essential to the proceedings of a grand jury . . . .”). 
 35. Kadish, supra note 26, at 23.  
 36. Id. at 24. 
 37. Id. at 45–47, 51–52, 62. 
 38. See FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 13–14. 
 39. The federal grand juror’s oath is as follows: 
Do each of you solemnly swear [affirm] to diligently inquire into and make true 
presentment or indictment of all such matters and things touching your present 
grand jury service that are given to you in charge or otherwise come to your 
knowledge; to keep secret the counsel of the United States, your fellows, and 
yourselves; and not to present or indict any person through hatred, malice, or ill 
will, nor to leave any person unpresented or unindicted through fear, favor, or 
affection or for any reward or hope or promise thereof, but in all your presentments 
and indictments to present the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to 
the best of your skill and understanding? If so, answer “I do.” 
BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 4, § 5.3. 
 40. FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 13. 
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persons—including interpreters, court reporters, and government 
attorneys—similarly obligated to secrecy of grand jury matters.41 
B.  The Purposes of Grand Jury Secrecy 
In its earliest form, grand jury secrecy functioned primarily to 
guarantee capture of the accused.42 Since then, courts have generally 
propounded four purposes for secrecy during grand jury proceedings: 
(1) to prevent the subject(s) of an investigation from 
escaping; 
(2) to ensure unreserved and evenhanded deliberations by 
grand jurors; 
(3) to promote truthfulness of witnesses; and 
(4) to safeguard the accused from unwanted attention and 
public judgment.43 
These objectives are vital to the administration of justice and the 
protections of the rights of the accused, and the Supreme Court has 
explained that grand jury secrecy successfully ensures the fulfillment 
of each of these objectives.44 But these objectives are vital only for the 
duration of the grand jury’s proceedings; as Former Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist explained: 
When an investigation ends, there is no longer a need to keep 
information from the targeted individual in order to prevent 
his escape—that individual presumably will have been 
exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise 
informed of the charges against him, on the other. There is 
also no longer a need to prevent the importuning of grand 
jurors since their deliberations will be over.45 
In other words, the conclusion of the grand jury proceedings displaces 
the four principal purposes of grand jury secrecy described above. 
There are, however, two interests in grand jury secrecy that courts 
consistently consider to be ongoing. The first is individual privacy, 
which protects the identities of those mentioned in grand jury 
 
 41. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
 42. Kadish, supra note 26, at 6. 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628–29 (3d Cir. 1954); In re Am. Historical 
Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK, 
supra note 28, at 13–14. 
 44. See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979). 
 45. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1990). 
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materials.46 For instance, privacy protects grand jurors who seek to 
avoid unwanted media attention due to their affiliation with a high-
profile investigation. Privacy also safeguards grand jury witnesses 
from potential retaliation resulting from their testimony against the 
grand jury subject. Lastly, because grand juries have the power to 
engage in a sweeping investigation that may confront innocent 
individuals,47 privacy ensures that the shadow of criminality is not cast 
over undeserving subjects.48 
The second indefinite interest in grand jury secrecy—an interest 
that this Note will later criticize as nebulous and unsupported—is 
institutional integrity, which focuses not on the respective grand juries 
but on a potential deterrent effect for subsequent grand juries and their 
participants.49 The grand jury’s investigative role depends upon its 
ability to call witnesses and establish a comprehensive understanding 
of the facts. Witnesses and grand jurors must feel a sense of security 
in providing testimony or deliberating honestly. In furthering that 
sense of security, many courts insist upon continued secrecy of grand 
jury materials to “ensur[e] future grand jurors and grand jury witnesses 
will not be inhibited due to the possibility of subsequent disclosure of 
proceedings.”50 
III.  RULE 6(E): THE GENERAL RULE OF SECRECY 
AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 6(e) sets forth the 
procedural framework for the secrecy of grand jury records. Rule 6(e) 
provides the following: 
 Rule 6. The Grand Jury 
 . . . . 
(e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings. 
. . .  
 
 46. In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 292. 
 47. With the power to investigate on mere suspicion of criminal activity, a grand jury 
investigation can be extremely broad. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 
(1950). 
 48. See In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 49. See, e.g., Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 566 n.11 (1983) (“[S]tringent 
protection of the secrecy of completed grand jury investigations may be necessary to encourage 
persons to testify fully and freely before future grand juries.”); Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222 
(“[T]he courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular grand jury, but also 
the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries.”). 
 50. In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 292. 
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(2) Secrecy. 
. . . 
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following 
persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the 
grand jury: 
(i) a grand juror; 
(ii) an interpreter; 
(iii) a court reporter; 
(iv) an operator of a recording device; 
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; 
(vi) an attorney for the government; or 
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made 
under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii). 
(3) Exceptions. 
. . . 
(E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it 
directs—of a grand-jury matter: 
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding; 
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a 
ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because 
of a matter that occurred before the grand jury; 
(iii) at the request of the government, when sought 
by a foreign court or prosecutor for use in an 
official criminal investigation; 
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that 
the matter may disclose a violation of State, Indian 
tribal, or foreign criminal law, as long as the 
disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government 
official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or 
(v) at the request of the government if it shows that 
the matter may disclose a violation of military 
criminal law under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate 
military official for the purpose of enforcing that 
law. 
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(F) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule 
6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the district where the grand 
jury convened.51 
Generally, Rule 6(e)(2) states that all “matter[s] occurring before the 
grand jury” must remain secret.52 Rule 6(e)(3) also sets forth several 
exceptions to secrecy, or ways in which a district court may authorize 
disclosure of grand jury materials.53 In those situations expressly 
described in Rule 6(e)(3), disclosure is undoubtedly appropriate.54 
Whether a district court may authorize disclosure of grand jury 
materials without express authorization from Rule 6(e)—that is, 
whether Rule 6(e)’s exceptions are exhaustive—is a juncture of 
ongoing debate. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has hinted at 
broader district court authority than Rule 6(e) expressly provides: 
“disclosure [is] committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Our 
cases announce the same principle, and Rule 6(e) is but declaratory of 
it.”55 On the other hand, the Court stated in the very same opinion that 
“any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered by [Rule] 6(e).”56 
Similarly, in Carlisle v. United States,57 the Supreme Court warned 
that district courts may not “develop rules that circumvent or conflict 
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,”58 hinting that any sort 
of discretionary disclosure would thus be improper as an attempt to 
circumvent the express exceptions of Rule 6(e). 
Circuit courts have been left to search for equipoise between these 
passages from the Supreme Court. Is disclosure indeed committed to 
the discretion of the trial court? Or does a discretionary inquiry attempt 
to sidestep the clearly denoted exceptions within Rule 6(e)? As 
explored below, the circuit courts that addressed this issue have 
rendered different results. Based on longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent and recent legislative action, however, it seems that the 
 
 51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. 
 52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). 
 53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3). 
 54. A party seeking grand jury materials under an established Rule 6(e) exception must 
nevertheless satisfy the “particularized need” test. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 217; see also United 
States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983) (“We have consistently construed the Rule . . . 
to require a strong showing of particularized need for grand jury materials before any disclosure 
will be permitted.”). 
 55. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). 
 56. Id. at 398. 
 57. 517 U.S. 416 (1996), superseded on other grounds by statute, FED. R. CRIM. P. 45. 
 58. Id. at 426. 
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courts holding Rule 6(e)’s exceptions to be exhaustive are on the right 
side of the analysis. 
A.  An Exhaustive Interpretation of Rule 6(e)’s Exceptions 
The Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia (D.C.) 
Circuits have unequivocally expressed their unwillingness to read 
beyond the scope of Rule 6(e),59 while the Third Circuit has hinted at 
a similarly restrictive interpretation.60 The Sixth Circuit, for instance, 
declined to “breach grand jury secrecy for any purpose other than 
those embodied by the Rule.”61 The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits 
echoed that same deference to the legislature.62 Finally, although 
reaching the same outcome, the D.C. Circuit differed in its analysis by 
taking a comprehensive approach to the Rule’s subparts.63 The D.C. 
Circuit read the clause in subpart 2 of Rule 6(e)—“[u]nless these rules 
provide otherwise”—to apply to subpart 3 of the Rule.64 In essence, 
the court took the position that “the secrecy requirement [in subpart 2] 
and its exceptions [in subpart 3] must be read together as an integrated 
whole.”65 The D.C. Circuit therefore confined the exceptions to those 
written.66 
B.  A Permissive Interpretation of Rule 6(e)’s Exceptions 
Contrarily, some circuit courts that have addressed the exceptions 
to grand jury secrecy have definitively held that “Rule 6(e)(3)(E) 
contains a permissive, not exhaustive, list of reasons for release of 
 
 59. Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2020); McKeever v. Barr, 920 
F.3d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. McDougal, 559 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2009); In 
re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d 481, 488 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 60. See McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1247–48 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Before a court 
must evaluate the need for continued secrecy under subsection (e)(3)(E), the party seeking 
disclosure must establish that the grand jury material sought falls within one of the six exceptions 
to the general rule of secrecy enumerated in Rule 6 . . . .”). 
 61. In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d at 488. 
 62. Pitch, 953 F.3d at 1234 (“The rule thus leaves no room for district courts to fashion new 
exceptions beyond those listed in Rule 6(e).”); McDougal, 559 F.3d at 840 (holding that “courts 
will not order disclosure absent a recognized exception to Rule 6(e)”). 
 63. See McKeever, 920 F.3d at 845. 
 64. Id. (alteration in original). 
 65. Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 769 (7th Cir. 2016) (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 66. McKeever, 920 F.3d at 850. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in McKeever is an intriguing one 
in that it seemingly undercuts D.C. Circuit precedent, as the dissent notes. See id. at 853–55 
(Srinivasan, J., dissenting); see also Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714, 715–16 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(authorizing disclosure of materials from the Nixon grand jury despite no express application of a 
Rule 6(e) exception). 
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grand jury materials.”67 Referring to a district court’s “inherent 
supervisory authority” to control procedures before it, the Second and 
Seventh Circuits permit petitioners to seek grand jury records outside 
the bounds of Rule 6(e).68 Also, as a matter of first impression in the 
First Circuit, a Massachusetts District Court recently determined that 
it had authority to release grand jury materials.69 
For the courts reading the listed exceptions of Rule 6(e) as 
permissive, there has been a uniform methodology for the disclosure 
inquiry based on a 1997 opinion out of the Second Circuit. In 1997, 
the Second Circuit in In re Craig70 enumerated nine factors to 
determine whether disclosure is appropriate beyond the confines of 
Rule 6(e).71 The Craig factors work to balance the interests in 
preserving secrecy with those in authorizing disclosure: 
(i) the identity of the party seeking disclosure; (ii) whether 
the defendant to the grand jury proceeding or the government 
opposes the disclosure; (iii) why disclosure is being sought 
in the particular case; (iv) what specific information is being 
sought for disclosure; (v) how long ago the grand jury 
proceedings took place; (vi) the current status of the 
principals of the grand jury proceedings and that of their 
families; (vii) the extent to which the desired material—
either permissibly or impermissibly—has been previously 
made public; (viii) whether witnesses to the grand jury 
proceedings who might be affected by disclosure are still 
alive; and (ix) the additional need for maintaining secrecy in 
the particular case in question.72 
Over the last couple of decades, these factors have served as the 
touchstone to analyze whether disclosure of decades-old grand jury 
materials, brought solely in the name of historical interest, is 
appropriate.73 
 
 67. Carlson, 837 F.3d at 766 (majority opinion); see also In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 103 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (allowing disclosure of grand jury materials in “special circumstances” beyond the 
express wording of Rule 6(e)). 
 68. In re Craig, 131 F.3d at 101; see id. at 103; Carlson, 837 F.3d at 766. 
 69. See Lepore v. United States, No. 18-mc-91539-ADB, 2020 BL 64811, at *2–7 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 4, 2020). 
 70. 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 71. Id. at 106. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Lepore, 2020 BL 64811, at *4–6 (“join[ing] those circuits that have adopted the 
Craig test” in evaluating, and partially granting, the petition of Jill Lepore for grand jury materials 
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Although the Second Circuit insisted that “there is no talismanic 
formula” for a disclosure inquiry,74 subsequent cases tell a different 
story. In fact, the centerpiece of the disclosure inquiry is consistently 
twofold: (1) whether there are any living individuals named in the 
grand jury materials whose privacy would be jeopardized upon 
disclosure, and (2) how the petitioner aims to use the sought 
information to benefit the public. Consider the following instances 
where district courts authorized disclosure of grand jury materials 
based solely on historical interest, as well as how those courts 
leveraged the Craig factors in doing so. 
1.  Grand Jury Investigation of the Chicago Tribune Press Leak 
During World War II 
Following the bombing at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States 
declared war on Japan75 and thus became an active participant in 
World War II.76 Six months later, the Japanese naval fleet prepared a 
strategic ambush of United States aircraft carriers to overtake position 
in the Pacific.77 Unbeknownst to the Japanese military commanders, 
 
relating to the leak of the Pentagon Papers); In re Pitch, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1373 (M.D. Ga. 2017) 
(using the Craig factors to grant a petition for grand jury materials from the 1946 Moore’s Ford 
lynching), rev’d, Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2020); Carlson v. United States, 
109 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (granting a petition for grand jury materials from the 
investigation during World War II into media leaks about the Battle of Midway), aff’d, 837 F.3d 
753 (7th Cir. 2016); In re Nat’l Sec. Archive, 104 F. Supp. 3d 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (granting a 
petition to historians seeking to unseal grand jury materials relating to the espionage of Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg); In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying disclosure under the 
Craig factors); In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting a petition for disclosure 
of select grand jury materials from the grand jury’s investigation into Richard Nixon and the 
Watergate scandal); In re Tabac, No. 3:08-mc-0243, 2009 WL 5213717 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 14, 
2009) (granting disclosure of some materials from the 1963 grand jury that indicted labor union 
leader James Hoffa); In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting 
disclosure of grand jury materials about the espionage of Alger Hiss). 
 74. In re Craig, 131 F.3d at 106. 
 75. One day after the bombing, President Franklin D. Roosevelt requested a war declaration 
from Congress. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Address to the Congress Asking That 
a State of War Be Declared Between the United States & Japan (Dec. 8, 1941) (transcript available 
in the Library of Congress). He declared December 7, 1941—the day of the Pearl Harbor attack—
to be “a date which will live in infamy.” Id. Less than an hour later, a joint session of Congress 
voted 470–1 to declare war against Japan. Andrew Glass, Congress Declares War on 
Japan, Dec. 8, 1941, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/1
2/congress-declares-war-on-japan-dec-7-1941-216461. 
 76. Take a Closer Look: America Goes to War, NAT’L WWII MUSEUM, 
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-
starters/america-goes-war-take-closer-look (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 77. The Battle of Midway, NAT’L WWII MUSEUM, 
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/battle-midway (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
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American code breakers had cracked the Japanese code and 
intercepted communications about the impending attack.78 In what 
historians describe as “the single most decisive aerial attack in naval 
history,”79 the United States military surprised the Japanese fleet with 
strategic force.80 The victory in the Battle of Midway was considered 
to be a significant turning point in World War II.81 
Upon the conclusion of the Battle of Midway, the Chicago 
Tribune published a front-page story titled Navy Had Word of Jap 
Plan to Strike at Sea.82 The story, which provided intricate details 
about the planned Japanese attack, suggested that United States 
intelligence had intercepted and deciphered the enemy codes.83 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other military leaders were 
furious about the leak.84 The Chicago Tribune story seemingly alerted 
the enemy about the success of American intelligence efforts, thus 
allowing the Japanese military to alter its communications. The news 
story “became one of the biggest and potentially damaging news leaks 
of World War II.”85 
A grand jury was convened in August 1942 to investigate the 
incident as a potential violation of the Espionage Act.86 The grand jury 
called several witnesses, including high-ranking military officers and 
members of the Chicago Tribune.87 In the end, no indictments were 
returned.88 Records from that 1942 grand jury investigation remained 
under seal for decades. 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Michael E. Ruane, Unsealed 75 Years After Battle of Midway: New Details of Alarming 
WWII Press Leak, CHI. TRIB. (June 6, 2017, 6:30 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nati
onworld/ct-battle-of-midway-press-leak-20170605-story.html. 
 80. See The Battle of Midway, supra note 77 (“TBD Devastator torpedo-bombers . . . from the 
USS Enterprise, USS Hornet, and USS Yorktown attacked the Japanese fleet. The Japanese 
carriers . . . were hit, set ablaze, and abandoned.”). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Ruane, supra note 79. 
 83. The author of Navy Had Word of Jap Plan to Strike at Sea was a war correspondent for 
the Chicago Tribune. He had been aboard one of the U.S. Navy ships to which the deciphered codes 
were sent. Id.; see Carlson v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 837 
F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 84. Carlson, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1026. 
 85. Ruane, supra note 79; see Carlson, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1026. 
 86. Carlson, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1026–27. 
 87. Petition for Order Directing Release of Transcripts of Certain Testimony from August 
1942 Grand Jury Investigation of the Chicago Tribune at 2–3, Carlson v. United States, 109 F. 
Supp. 3d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-09244), 2014 WL 6478778. 
 88. Carlson, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1027. 
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In 2014, renowned World War II journalist and historian Elliot 
Carlson petitioned an Illinois district court for access to transcripts 
from the grand jury.89 The court used the Craig factors in its analysis.90 
The lapse of over seventy years meant that any people mentioned in 
the grand jury materials had likely passed away. Because of the 
seventy-year lapse since the grand jury, secrecy interests had 
“dissipated.”91 
As for the interests in disclosure, the court found them to be 
forceful. Several historical groups devoted to the study of World War 
II joined Carlson in his petition.92 The court noted that the identity of 
the petitioners—a World War II expert in association with several 
historical groups—“militate[d] in favor of disclosure.”93 Furthermore, 
transcripts from the 1942 grand jury investigation could provide long-
sought answers, such as what or whom the grand jury investigated as 
well as how the Chicago Tribune staff was able to obtain highly 
classified information about the impending attack. Lastly and 
seemingly most important to the court were the larger implications of 
these grand jury materials to notions of democracy: “[T]he Tribune 
investigation implicates broader principles, namely, the relationship 
between the government and the press in a democratic society, 
particularly as to matters impacting national security. Even now, there 
is a robust public debate surrounding the government’s prosecution of 
members of the press for violations of the Espionage Act.”94 As a 
result, the court granted Carlson’s petition,95 a decision that was 
upheld by the Seventh Circuit on appeal.96 
2.  The Petitions of Stanley Kutler and Luke Nichter for 
Grand Jury Materials Relating to the Watergate Scandal 
On June 17, 1972, five men were arrested at the Democratic 
National Convention headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in 
 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 1034–37. 
 91. Id. at 1036. 
 92. Id. at 1034. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. at 1035. 
 95. Id. at 1037. 
 96. See Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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Washington, D.C.97 A security guard discovered the group and 
subsequently called police.98 The men were equipped with 
surveillance equipment in “what authorities described as an elaborate 
plot to bug the offices of the Democratic National Committee.”99 At 
first, there was no apparent reason behind the operation. Just a few 
months later, however, the Washington Post broke news that the 
Watergate intruders were part of a “massive campaign of political 
spying and sabotage conducted on behalf of President Nixon’s re-
election.”100 
President Nixon and many White House aides were under intense 
scrutiny for allegedly using the Central Intelligence Agency to 
obstruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s investigation into the 
break-in.101 An investigative committee was established within the 
Senate to look into the scandal.102 It was later discovered that President 
Nixon recorded all conversations within the Oval Office, suggesting 
that audio tapes may have held the key to understanding the truth of 
Watergate.103 An eventual subpoena for the audio tapes led to a 
landmark case before the Supreme Court—in which the Court ordered 
release of the tapes—regarding notions of separation of powers and 
executive privilege.104 After further ridicule and an eventual audio 
tape labeled the “smoking gun,”105 Nixon resigned from office in 
 
 97. Alfred E. Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH. POST (June 18, 
1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/061872-
1.htm. 
 98. Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (The Watergate Committee), U.S. 
SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Watergate.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 99. Lewis, supra note 97. 
 100. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 10, 1972), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-finds-nixon-aides-sabotaged-
democrats/2012/06/06/gJQAoHIJJV_story.html?utm_term=.4da287eb7d89. 
 101. Faith Karimi, Watergate Scandal: A Look Back at Crisis That Changed US Politics, CNN 
(May 17, 2017, 8:12 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/17/politics/watergate-scandal-look-
back/index.html?no-st=9999999999. 
 102. Id.; Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (The Watergate Committee), 
supra note 98. 
 103. Karimi, supra note 101. 
 104. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). 
 105. Andrew Glass, Watergate ‘Smoking Gun’ Tape Released, Aug. 5, 1974, POLITICO (Aug. 5, 
2018, 6:50 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/05/watergate-smoking-gun-tape-
released-aug-5-1974-753086. 
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1974.106 By the end of 1975, three grand juries had been convened to 
investigate the events.107 
Professors Stanley Kutler and Luke Nichter separately petitioned 
the Washington D.C. district court in 2010 and 2013, respectively, for 
records from one of the grand juries empaneled in connection with the 
Watergate scandal.108 In a telling pair of decisions, the district court 
granted the petition of Kutler,109 while denying that of Nichter.110 
Faced with petitions for grand jury materials relating to the same 
monumental historical event, the court differed in its decisions. So, 
what set Kutler’s petition apart from Nichter’s? 
In short, privacy interests were dispositive for the professors. 
Kutler’s petition sought only a limited range of materials, and the 
people mentioned in those materials had either passed away or 
publicly discussed their own involvement.111 Nichter’s petition, 
however, requested materials that would disclose the identity of a 
named individual known to be living, while implicating several other 
individuals whose status was unknown.112 Although the court 
ostensibly based its decision on a consideration of all relevant Craig 
factors, it is evident that privacy concerns were controlling. A footnote 
in the Nichter case suggests that, regardless of the relevance of other 
Craig factors, the court would have reached a different result if 
individual privacy was not at risk: “Disclosure may be appropriate 
following the death of all persons named in the grand jury materials. 
The Court would also reconsider its ruling if it was presented with 
evidence that the named individuals had consented to release.”113 
With privacy interests abated in Kutler, the court recognized the 
vast historical implications of the grand jury’s records. Synonymous 
with scandal, Watergate is a historic political tribulation, and many 
mysteries persisted. Some documents remained under seal from the 
Watergate grand juries,114 including the testimony of President 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 108. See id. at 43; In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 109. In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 43. 
 110. In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 214. 
 111. In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 49. 
 112. In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 213. 
 113. Id. at 213 n.14. 
 114. See id. at 207; In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 43–44. 
(8) 53.4_ARONSOHN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  11:37 AM 
966 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:949 
Nixon.115 There was no public information as to what was contained 
on the illegal wiretaps from the Watergate Hotel.116 Furthermore, 
historians continually debate what truly motivated the Watergate 
break-in.117 More broadly, Watergate “changed American politics 
forever”118 and is “widely considered to be the biggest [scandal] in 
political history anywhere in the world.”119 With the undeniable 
historical significance of the Watergate scandal, public interest 
persists in gaining a comprehensive record to fully understand the 
motives and planning that went into such an endeavor. 
C.  Why Rule 6(e)’s Exceptions Are Exhaustive 
To begin, the tradition of grand jury secrecy is revered throughout 
American jurisprudence.120 Courts have described secrecy as 
“sacrosanct”121 and “older than our Nation itself.”122 In accordance 
with the apparent holiness of secrecy, the Supreme Court has evinced 
its unwillingness to permit disclosure of grand jury materials: “In the 
absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always be 
reluctant to conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been 
authorized.”123 Against this backdrop, it is more likely that Rule 6(e)’s 
exceptions are indeed exhaustive. Because of the great weight 
 
 115. President Nixon’s testimony is alleged to have addressed four different subjects, including 
the “smoking gun” tape and the potential misuse of federal agencies. See In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 
2d at 43–44. 
 116. See Petition to Unseal Specified Documents Related to United States v. Liddy, Criminal 
No. 72-1827 by Luke A. Nichter at 1, In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-
mc-00074-RCL). 
 117. See id. 
 118. Karimi, supra note 101. 
 119. Hugh O’Connell, What Was Watergate? Here Are 14 Facts that Explain Everything, 
THEJOURNAL.IE (June 24, 2012, 9:15 AM), https://www.thejournal.ie/what-was-watergate-14-
facts-richard-nixon-494970-Jun2012. 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983) (“Both Congress 
and this Court have consistently stood ready to defend [grand jury secrecy] . . . . In the absence of 
a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always be reluctant to conclude that a breach of this 
secrecy has been authorized.”); Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 
(1979) (“We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system 
depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”). 
 121. United States v. Phillips, 843 F.2d 438, 441 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The secrecy of the grand 
jury is sacrosanct.”). 
 122. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). 
 123. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 425; see also Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 
616–17 (1980) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, 
additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative 
intent.”). 
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accorded to grand jury secrecy, disclosure seems permissible only by 
way of legislation.124 
Moreover, Supreme Court authority suggests that district courts’ 
reliance on their inherent supervisory authority is misplaced in 
permitting disclosure of grand jury materials beyond the Rule 6(e) 
exceptions. A district court’s inherent supervisory authority, well-
established by the Supreme Court,125 refers to the ability of the district 
court to establish its own procedural rules.126 That authority, however, 
is not limitless.127 The Supreme Court has held that this authority 
relates only to procedures not expressly provided by the Constitution 
or Congress.128 As a result, a district court may not establish its own 
rules that “circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.”129 
Disclosure of grand jury materials is far from a mere procedural 
move. First, the grand jury is not technically within the constitutional 
province of the judicial branch,130 and the Supreme Court has 
therefore “been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory power as 
a basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.”131 Second, the 
 
 124. Judge Reena Raggi, Chair of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, explained that 
a change in the presumption of absolute, indefinite secrecy would be “radical” and that “[a] change 
of that magnitude . . . would have to be accomplished through legislation, rather than a rule 
change.” Minutes from Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure Meeting of June 11–12, 2012, at 
44 (June 11–12, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST06-2012-min.pdf. 
 125. See, e.g., Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254–55 (1988); United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505–06 (1983). 
 126. See Bank of N.S., 487 U.S. at 254. 
 127. A court may not exercise its supervisory power “if it conflicts with constitutional or 
statutory provisions.” Id. (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985)). 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 254; Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505. 
 129. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996), superseded on other grounds by 
statute, FED. R. CRIM. P. 45. 
 130. The Supreme Court summarized the position of the grand jury relative to the three 
branches of government: 
“[R]ooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history,” the grand jury is mentioned in 
the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually 
assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It “‘is a 
constitutional fixture in its own right.’” In fact the whole theory of its function is that it 
belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or 
referee between the Government and the people. Although the grand jury normally 
operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional 
relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length. 
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted) 
(alternation in original). 
 131. Id. at 49–50; see also United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983) (“Both 
Congress and this Court have consistently stood ready to defend [grand jury secrecy] against 
unwarranted intrusion. In the absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always be 
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instances in which the Supreme Court has upheld a district court’s 
action by reference to the inherent power relate to judicial economy in 
litigation presently before the district court,132 not to procedures 
decades after its conclusion. Disclosure of grand jury records is not 
consistent with notions of efficiency, as the prosecution underlying the 
grand jury was likely concluded decades prior. Third, as the D.C. 
Circuit recognized in McKeever v. Barr,133 the Supreme Court’s 
deference to a district court’s inherent authority has come only within 
the context of an express Rule 6(e) exception.134 There has been no 
such deference without the clear applicability of Rule 6(e). 
A final indication of Rule 6(e)’s exhaustiveness comes by way of 
recent legislation, the Civil Rights Cold Case Records Collection Act 
(the “Act”).135 The Act mandates publication of civil rights cold case 
records by the National Archives and Records Administration.136 The 
Act suggests that Congress does not believe that courts have the 
inherent authority to disclose historically significant materials, as any 
materials subject to disclosure under the Act could surely be disclosed 
under the Craig factors as courts have applied them. In other words, 
there would be no reason for Congress to enact this sort of legislation 
if the district courts were to have inherent authority to disclose records 
from those cold cases. 
IV.  A PROPOSED HISTORICAL EXCEPTION TO GRAND JURY SECRECY 
In 2012, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure rejected a proposed historical exception, averring 
that “district judges had reasonably resolved applications by reference 
 
reluctant to conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been authorized.”); Illinois v. Abbott & 
Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 573 (1983) (denying disclosure of grand jury records to a state attorney 
general because the “disclosure requested by the State . . . is not permitted by Rule 6(e)”). 
 132. The Supreme Court explained: 
The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been 
considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control 
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases. 
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 
U.S. 32, 46–51 (1991) (holding that “a federal court may . . . resort to its inherent power to impose 
attorney’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct”). 
 133. 920 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 134. Id. at 846 (citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 396 n.1 
(1959)). 
 135. See Civil Rights Cold Case Records Collection Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-426, 132 
Stat. 5489 (2019). 
 136. Id. 
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to their inherent authority.”137 But this comment came at a nascent 
stage in the development of Rule 6(e)’s jurisprudence. It came before 
the 2019 decision in McKeever v. Barr, in which the D.C. Circuit 
limited disclosure of grand jury materials solely to the delineated 
exceptions under Rule 6(e).138 It also came before the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Cold Case Records Collection Act, another suggestive 
move by the legislature that Rule 6(e) forecloses disclosure beyond 
the express exceptions. 
The jurisprudence surrounding disclosure of historically 
significant materials under Rule 6(e) will only become more unclear 
without a statutory exception. The Eleventh Circuit, which just 
recently heard oral arguments en banc in the case of grand jury 
materials related to the Moore’s Ford lynching in 1946, will soon 
determine whether its courts have inherent disclosure authority under 
Rule 6(e).139 And, similarly, a Boston district court currently faced 
with a petition for grand jury materials related to the 1971 leak of the 
Pentagon papers140 will have to determine the scope of Rule 6(e) as a 
matter of first impression within the First Circuit.141 With circuit 
courts differing as to the scope of Rule 6(e), and with the immense 
historical significance of these untapped grand jury materials, it is time 
for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to reassess the historical exception to grand jury secrecy. 
This Note proposes the following exception as an amendment to Rule 
6(e): 
(E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a 
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it 
directs—of a grand-jury matter: 
 
 137. Memorandum from Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 20 (May 17, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2012-05-
criminal_rules_report_0.pdf. 
 138. McKeever, 920 F.3d at 844, 850. 
 139. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Urges Full 11th Circuit to Release Grand Jury Records 
of Unsolved 1946 Lynching, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 24, 2019, 10:36 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/n
ews/article/lawyer-urges-full-11th-circuit-to-release-grand-jury-records-of-unsolved-1946-
lynching. 
 140. See Lepore v. United States, No. 18-mc-91539-ADB, 2020 BL 64811, at *1–2 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 4, 2020). 
 141. Although the First Circuit has not expressly decided the issue, it has suggested that a 
district court’s inherent power could permit disclosure of historically significant materials in 
“extraordinary circumstances.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005); see 
also Lepore, 2020 BL 64811, at *3. 
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. . . . 
(vi) on the petition of any interested person if, 
after notice to the government and an 
opportunity for a hearing, the district court 
finds on the record by a preponderance of the 
evidence that: 
(a) the petition seeks grand jury records; 
(b) the records would have a material effect 
on the historical record; 
(c) at least 40 years have passed since the 
relevant case files associated with the 
grand-jury records have been closed; 
(d) no living person would be materially 
prejudiced by disclosure, or that any 
prejudice could be avoided through 
redactions or such other reasonable steps as 
the court may direct; 
(e) no other reason exists that requires 
continued secrecy.142 
A statutory exception is beneficial because it works toward 
uniformity among circuits, which is an important objective in all facets 
of the law. More pointedly, this proposal accomplishes three important 
objectives: (1) historical clarity through firsthand accounts; (2) 
adherence to the true and longstanding objectives of grand jury 
secrecy; and (3) resolution of governmental concerns about disclosure. 
Each of these objectives is explored below. 
A.  A Comprehensive Historical Record 
A full and accurate record is firstly important to discover the truth 
of what happened. It is vital to comprehensively inform scholars of the 
events which they interpret and analyze. But it is not the inherent value 
in comprehensiveness that underlies a historical exception. Instead, 
the foremost motivation of the exception is that each petition for 
historically significant materials has broader implications. For 
example, disclosure may unearth information that has the potential to 
 
 142. This historical exception is based largely on Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2011 proposal 
to the Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney 
Gen., to Hon. Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules 9 (Oct. 18, 2011), 
legaltimes.typepad.com/files/holder_letter_grand_jury.pdf. 
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supplement an important debate, or to shine light on governmental 
missteps, or to foster trust in government. 
Consider the impact of a full historical record on American 
society. Perhaps nothing is more fundamental to the operation of 
democratic change than access to information, which allows for 
critical analysis of government actions.143 The Carlson court 
permitted disclosure in large part due to the tense and controversial 
relationship between government and the media, especially during 
wartime.144 The grand jury records relating to the Chicago Tribune 
leak were an important supplement to the ongoing “robust public 
debate surrounding the government’s prosecution of members of the 
press for violations of the Espionage Act.”145 
Similarly, the Kutler court authorized disclosure for materials 
relating to Watergate,146 an unprecedented instance of corruption by 
President Nixon. The court noted that the significance of the 
Watergate scandal “cannot be overstated” as a way to “foster further 
scholarly discussion, and improve the public’s understanding.”147 
Grand jury materials from both Carlson and Kutler could materially 
supplement topical issues, especially given the tense relationship 
 
 143. James Madison once wrote: “A popular Government, without popular information, or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will 
forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves 
with the power which knowledge gives.” James Madison, Letter from James Madison to W. T. 
Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 276, 276–81 (Phila.: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865); see also 
Steven L. Katz, Transparency in the U.S.: Towards Worldwide Access to Government, J. PUB. 
INQUIRY, Fall/Winter 2001, at 55, 55 (“In a democracy, citizens are the governors and the governed. 
Nothing is more essential to the concept of self-governance than access to government 
information.”). 
 144. See Carlson v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff’d, 837 F.3d 
753 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 145. Id. 
 146. In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d 42, 47 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 147. Id. at 48. 
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between the government and the media,148 as well as the ongoing 
accusations of misconduct against sitting President Trump.149 
A comprehensive historical record provides further benefits, 
articulated by New York District Judge Leisure: 
Access to [grand jury] information inevitably enhances the 
accuracy of history and undermines the false conspiracy 
theories and revisionism that tend to arise when information 
remains secret. Moreover, disclosure can only, in the long 
run, build confidence in our government by affirming that it 
is open, in all respects, to scrutiny by the people.150 
Without a statutory historical exception to grand jury secrecy, 
these benefits of a comprehensive historical record are difficult to 
attain. Under the existing framework, the possibility that a district 
court authorizes disclosure solely for historical or academic reasons 
depends entirely on the district court’s location. If a district court sits 
in the D.C. Circuit, for instance, disclosure of grand jury materials for 
historical significance is impermissible,151 as opposed to a district 
court in the Second Circuit.152 Because only the district in which the 
grand jury was empaneled has the authority to release the materials, 
the comprehensiveness of the historical record therefore varies based 
upon where the grand jury was convened.153 This geographical 
arbitrariness looms as a potential hindrance to documents of vital 
 
 148. See, e.g., Margaret Sullivan, Trump’s Attacks on the News Media Are Accelerating. You 
Can Expect Three Results, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2019, 8:48 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trumps-attacks-on-the-news-media-are-
accelerating-you-can-expect-three-results/2019/09/03/fedfff66-ce3d-11e9-87fa-
8501a456c003_story.html; Peter Baker, Trump Bars CNN’s Jim Acosta from the White House, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/trump-cnn-acosta-
white-house.html. 
 149. Stephen Collinson, New Revelations from First Public Hearings Paint Damning Portrait 
of Trump, CNN (Nov. 14, 2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/14/politics/donald-
trump-impeachment-hearing/index.html. 
 150. In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 151. See McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (limiting disclosure of grand 
jury materials to the exceptions stated in Rule 6(e)). 
 152. See In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997) (permitting disclosure of grand jury 
materials beyond the Rule 6(e) exceptions). 
 153. A petitioner must petition the district court where the grand jury was convened. See FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(F); see also Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 224–25 
(1979) (“The federal courts that have addressed the question generally have said that the request 
for disclosure of grand jury minutes under Rule 6(e) must be directed toward the court under whose 
auspices the grand jury was empaneled.”). 
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importance, especially considering the D.C. Circuit’s recurring role in 
major political affairs. 
The paradigmatic example of this danger comes in the form of 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s grand jury. Mueller recently 
convened a grand jury in Washington, D.C., to investigate collusion 
between the Russian government and the presidential campaign of 
Donald Trump.154 With the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in 
McKeever v. Barr, however, matters before a Washington D.C. grand 
jury can never be disclosed unless they fall within a specific Rule 6(e) 
exception.155 It is conceivable, then, that the teachings of Mueller’s 
grand jury are lost.156 Decades from now, scholars will be unable to 
analyze an unprecedented investigation in American history. 
Prosecutors would be deprived of potentially valuable insight as to the 
investigation of high-profile subjects, especially those in the American 
government. And the public may be kept in the dark about the years-
long investigation into one of its elected leaders. 
Furthermore, there is a strong likelihood that the exceptions to 
secrecy are indeed exhaustive.157 Based on existing Supreme Court 
precedent and recent legislative moves, it seems more likely than not 
that a district court’s inherent supervisory authority does not extend so 
far as to permit circumvention of the rules of grand jury secrecy.158 
Once this power is inevitably curtailed—whether through the 
legislature or the Supreme Court—disclosure in instances of academic 
or historical interest may be entirely foreclosed, meaning that 
historians and scholars would be denied access to these valuable 
materials. 
 
 154. Katelyn Polantz, Grand Jury Investigation Started by Mueller ‘Continuing Robustly,’ 
Prosecutor Says, CNN (Mar. 27, 2019, 10:05 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/27/politics/Mu
eller-grand-jury-investigation/index.html. 
 155. McKeever, 920 F.3d at 850. 
 156. Although the secrecy protections remain in place over the grand jury materials with respect 
to the general public, a district court recently authorized disclosure of the Mueller grand jury 
materials to the House of Representatives under one of the Rule 6(e) exceptions. The district court 
determined that Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(i), which authorizes disclosure “preliminarily to or in connection 
with a judicial proceeding,” applied to the sought materials for use in impeachment proceedings. 
In re Comm. on the Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129, 164–65 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 157. See supra Part III. 
 158. See supra Part III. 
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B.  Preservation of Secrecy Interests 
The second objective accomplished by a historical exception is 
the balance between disclosure and the preservation of the general rule 
of secrecy. A historical exception maintains the ongoing presumption 
of secrecy as a backdrop for all disclosure petitions to protect 
individuals who are named in grand jury materials, yet it also ensures 
access to important grand jury records by adhering to the true reasons 
for indefinite secrecy. 
1.  The Ongoing Presumption of Secrecy 
The most important caveat in a historical exception to grand jury 
secrecy is the preservation of the secrecy presumption. Secrecy is 
overwhelmingly significant for the protection of citizens, so it should 
not be sidestepped. 
The presumption persists by way of three provisions in the 
proposal. The first is the requirement that the grand jury records will 
have a “material effect on the historical record.” This determination, 
which courts can undertake by an in camera review,159 seeks to 
combine three of the Craig factors that courts have afforded 
considerable weight: the identity of the petitioner, the reason(s) 
disclosure is requested, and the specific information sought.160 A 
petitioner does not carry an easy burden to establish that she seeks 
historically significant information that will materially affect the 
historical record. Moreover, by limiting disclosure only to those 
materials that will have a genuinely cognizable effect on the historical 
record, any extraneous materials are not unnecessarily released. 
Second, the forty-year requirement similarly works to safeguard 
the presumption of secrecy. To be sure, the passage of time is not 
dispositive in a disclosure inquiry, but it is a sweeping first step in 
displacing privacy concerns.161 For one, it increases the likelihood that 
someone named in the grand jury materials is deceased. Additionally, 
it almost guarantees that investigations have been able to run their 
 
 159. The Nichter court reviewed grand jury materials in camera and determined that the sought 
materials would not “help resolve any ambiguities in the historical record.” In re Nichter, 949 F. 
Supp. 2d 205, 214 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 160. In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 161. See, e.g., id. at 107 (“[T]he passage of time erodes many of the justifications for continued 
secrecy.”); Carlson v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1036 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“[A]fter so many 
years the traditional reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy have typically dissipated.”), aff’d, 
837 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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course, so disclosure does not jeopardize ongoing or future criminal 
proceedings. Finally, with respect to a court’s determination of the 
historical value of grand jury materials, forty years is a sufficient 
benchmark such that ongoing academic interest suggests actual 
historical significance in uncovering and analyzing what the grand 
jury undertook. 
Third, the “catch-all provision” under subpart (e)—“no other 
reason exists that requires continued secrecy”—ensures that courts 
will not permit disclosure if it is improper. If the government can 
identify any ongoing privacy interest, the grand jury record should 
remain sealed.162 One conceivable situation necessitating ongoing 
secrecy is where disclosure would be detrimental to national security 
or law enforcement. If, for instance, disclosure of grand jury materials 
would jeopardize an ongoing investigation or leak valuable 
government secrets, disclosure would be wholly inappropriate. After 
all, a historical exception to grand jury secrecy is meant to benefit the 
public. 
2.  Protecting Individual Privacy and 
Dispelling Institutional Integrity 
As discussed above in Part II, courts consistently cite two long-
term purposes of secrecy: individual privacy and institutional 
integrity.163 Individual privacy is of the utmost importance, as it 
effectively protects the reputations and well-being of those involved 
 
 162. Courts have consistently adhered to secrecy where privacy concerns remain. See, e.g., In 
re Nat’l Sec. Archive, 104 F. Supp. 3d 625, 627, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (granting the renewed 
petition brought by historians and archivists following the deaths of witnesses from a grand jury 
convened to investigate Julius and Ethel Rosenberg); In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (denying 
a petition for Watergate grand jury materials where “at least one of the subjects of grand jury 
testimony . . . is still living”); In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49–50 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting a 
petition for Watergate grand jury materials where the “sole testifying witness passed away in 
1994”); In re Shepard, 800 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying a petition for Watergate 
grand jury materials where secrecy concerns were prevalent and the petitioner failed to adequately 
address those concerns); In re Tabac, No. 3:08-mc-0243, 2009 WL 5213717, at *2–3 (M.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 14, 2009) (authorizing disclosure of grand jury materials related to the deceased Jimmy Hoffa 
and prohibiting disclosure of materials naming other individuals unknown to be living or deceased); 
In re Nat’l Sec. Archive, No. 08 Civ. 6599, 2008 WL 8985358, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008) 
(ordering disclosure of materials from a grand jury, the witnesses for which were deceased or had 
consented to disclosure of their identities). 
 163. See supra Part II. 
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with the grand jury. Courts sensibly recognize it as the driving force 
behind ongoing secrecy.164 
Even where individual privacy is nonexistent, though, courts 
generally hail grand jury secrecy as an indefinite necessity under the 
guise of institutional integrity. But institutional integrity is abstract 
and unsupported. It is the idea that, decades into the future, witnesses 
may not testify honestly because their statements may eventually be 
disclosed after their deaths. Even the Supreme Court has tenuously 
referred to this interest, mentioning a “possible [deterrent] effect”165 
on future grand juries and that preserving secrecy for institutional 
integrity “may be necessary.”166 
There is no evidence that a witness would be deterred from 
testifying—or a grand juror would be deterred from deliberating 
honestly—if she knew her name would be publicized or her statements 
might be disclosed after her death. One court, in fact, expressly 
discounted the idea of institutional integrity for the same reasons.167 It 
is far too unsubstantiated a notion to be the sole anchor for ongoing 
secrecy, especially in relation to historically significant grand jury 
records.168 
In addition to the mere absence of evidence supporting the idea 
of institutional integrity, its basis seems rather senseless. In most grand 
 
 164. Individual privacy has generally been determinative of whether disclosure of grand jury 
materials is appropriate. Compare In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (prohibiting disclosure 
where at least one individual was living), and In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 62 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 
1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (prohibiting disclosure of certain grand jury materials relevant to two 
witnesses who “have not been confirmed to be deceased and are not known to have consented to 
release of the relevant testimony”), with In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (authorizing disclosure 
where the people mentioned in a limited range of materials had either passed away or publicly 
discussed their own involvement), and In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 293 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (authorizing disclosure where people named in the grand jury materials were 
confirmed to be deceased or had consented to disclosure). 
 165. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 166. Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 566 n.11 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 167. See In re Kutler, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (“[T]he Court does not believe that disclosing 
thirty-six-year-old records for historical purposes will deter future witnesses from providing grand 
jury testimony.”). 
 168. The late attorney Samuel Dash explained a common phenomenon in law: 
One of the weaknesses of the American criminal law is that legal fictions become so 
firmly entrenched that it is considered sacrilegious to disclose or dislodge them. A 
concept that is apparently antiquated will be retained solely because of the sacrosanct 
preeminence ascribed to it by tradition. As other legal institutions attempt to adjust to 
and grow with the times, the legal fiction, with remarkable resilience, continues 
unimpeded and unchanged. 
Samuel Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807, 818 (1972). 
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juries convened to investigate events of historical significance, there 
was widespread media coverage of the event. Although grand jurors 
or witnesses may have had an interest in keeping their privacy during 
their lifetimes, “the often extensive contemporaneous attention given 
to the case is likely to . . . make the possibility of disclosure decades 
hence based on historical interest seem a trifling concern, or even an 
inevitability.”169 
Accordingly, this Note’s proposal for a historical exception 
recognizes the reality of the need for secrecy and does not include the 
idea of institutional integrity as a basis for prohibiting disclosure. The 
proposed subpart (d) permits disclosure only where “no living person 
would be materially prejudiced” by it. Because the need for secrecy is 
really coterminous with the lives of the individuals named in the grand 
jury materials, it is necessary for a district court to determine whether 
any of those individuals are living, or perhaps even whether there is a 
possibility that any of those individuals are living.170 But once those 
privacy concerns subside, “[s]ecrecy for secrecy’s sake should no 
longer be the rule . . . . Rather, the maintenance of the wall of secrecy 
around grand jury testimony should be grounded upon sound 
reason.”171 
C.  Addressing the Government’s Concerns 
The government has expressed two overarching concerns in its 
opposition to petitions for grand jury materials on the basis of 
historical significance. First, the government argues, permitting 
district courts to determine the boundaries of their own authority under 
Rule 6(e) is perilous.172 Permitting disclosure beyond Rule 6(e) 
 
 169. In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 292. 
 170. See In re Nichter, 949 F. Supp. 2d 205, 213 (D.D.C. 2013) (preserving secrecy of grand 
jury materials where it was “possible that other individuals—grand jurors and witnesses—named 
in the materials [were] still living”). 
 171. Parlapiano v. Dist. Court in & for the Tenth Judicial Dist., 491 P.2d 965, 968 (Colo. 1971). 
 172. See, e.g., En Banc Brief for Appellant at 16–31, Pitch v. United States, 915 F.3d 704 (11th 
Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15016), 2019 WL 3815069, at *16–31; Response of the United States in 
Opposition to Petitioner’s Request for Order Directing Release of Transcripts and Related 
Materials on the Grand Jury Convened in the Middle District of Georgia on December 2, 1946, 
Pertaining to the “Moore’s Ford Lynching” at 3–6, In re Pitch, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1373 (M.D. Ga. 
2017) (No. 5:14-MC-2); United States’ Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Order Directing 
Release of Transcripts of Certain Testimony from August 1942 Grand Jury Investigation of the 
Chicago Tribune at 6–23, Carlson v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (No. 
1:14-cv-09244); Department of Justice’s Response to Petition to Unseal at 18–23, In re Nichter, 
949 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-mc-00074-RCL); Department of Justice’s Opposition 
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renders unpredictability, and the analysis could lend itself to the 
pernicious decay of Rule 6(e) into futility. Second, the government 
invokes a “floodgate” argument, contending that this exception would 
invite all members of the public to enjoy grand jury access by simply 
invoking a historical purpose.173 The codification of a historical 
exception to grand jury secrecy comprehensively addresses these 
issues. 
1.  Placing a Limit on District Courts’ Inherent 
Supervisory Authority 
The government’s concern as to some courts’ expansive view of 
Rule 6(e) is a valid one. If a district court may cite to its “inherent 
supervisory authority” to implement its own rules, where might this 
authority end? Rule 6(e) was enacted for a reason, and its provisions 
must be given effect. 
A statutory exception would limit petitions based on historical 
significance to the express terms of Rule 6(e) while also suggesting 
that Rule 6(e) is indeed exhaustive in its exceptions to secrecy. A 
historical exception would therefore curtail the inherent supervisory 
authority while bringing more predictability to disclosure inquiries. It 
would further work to avoid many of the contentious and time-
consuming briefs put forth by litigants regarding the scope of Rule 
6(e), an issue that tends to be dispositive in many of these petitions. 
2.  The “Floodgate” Concern 
The government has raised concerns that the source of historical 
interest can easily be confounded. That is, there may be an influx of 
petitions—many of which would be granted—“simply to satisfy the 
public’s curiosity about what occurred before the grand jury,”174 rather 
 
to Petition to Unseal Transcript of Richard M. Nixon’s Grand Jury Testimony of June 23–24, 1975 
and Associated Materials of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force at 4–6, In re Kutler, 800 F. 
Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:10-mc-00547-RCL). 
 173. See, e.g., En Banc Brief for Appellant, Pitch v. United States, supra note 172, at 40; United 
States’ Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion,  Carlson v. United States, supra note 172, at 22–23; 
Department of Justice’s Response to Petition to Unseal, In re Nichter, supra note 172, at 22–23; 
Department of Justice’s Opposition to Petition, In re Kutler, supra note 172, at 18. 
 174. En Banc Brief for Appellant, Pitch v. United States, supra note 172, at 24; see also 
Department of Justice’s Response to Petition to Unseal, In re Nichter, supra note 172, at 22–23 
(“Even if part of a significant project of historical scholarship, such requests could not easily be 
distinguished from journalistic inquiries into subjects of public interest or requests based simply on 
individual or public curiosity.”); Department of Justice’s Opposition to Petition, In re Kutler, supra 
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than to foster valuable discussion in an academic or historical context. 
With its Craig opinion in 1997, the Second Circuit anticipated this 
argument, noting that “[h]istorical interest is . . . distinguishable from 
journalistic intrigue, public curiosity, or even a subjective importance 
to family and friends.”175 
The proposed subpart (b), which requires that “the records . . . 
have a material effect on the historical record,” cures the government’s 
concern by ensuring that the materials sought will indeed be put to 
good use. Thus, a court’s analysis regarding disclosure is not 
whimsical in nature, and a historical exception to grand jury secrecy 
would not be a limitless invitation to seek grand jury materials. District 
courts, in looking to whether the petitioner could leverage the 
materials to materially affect the historical record, are able to make a 
fact-specific determination and ensure that disclosure is indeed 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the historical exception, 
namely the genuine enhancement of the historical record. When 
scholars seek historical records to enhance the public record in hopes 
of fostering intellectual debate, this comes in stark contrast to mere 
curiosity of a layperson. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In early 2020, a Massachusetts District Court determined that it 
possessed the inherent authority to release grand jury materials 
relating to the leak of the Pentagon Papers.176 Less than two months 
later, the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite result, determining that 
its district courts cannot disclose historically significant grand jury 
materials under Rule 6(e).177 Evidently, the uncertainty continues. 
Each new petition invites tireless litigation, as the government 
and the petitioners pen extensive briefs based primarily on the 
procedural contours of Rule 6(e) instead of the petition’s merits. As 
more historians seek to unravel the mysteries of the past, and as more 
district and circuit courts confront the disclosure inquiry, 
jurisprudence surrounding Rule 6(e) will become even more 
inconsistent and unpredictable. A statutory exception for grand jury 
 
note 172, at 23–24 (“[S]uch requests could not easily be distinguished from journalistic inquiries 
into subjects of public interest or requests based simply on individual or public curiosity.”). 
 175. In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 105 n.8 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 176. See Lepore v. United States, No. 18-mc-91539-ADB, 2020 BL 64811, at *6 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 4, 2020). 
 177. See Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1241 (11th Cir. 2020). 
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materials of historical significance eliminates the need for procedural 
contentions. It promotes judicial economy, creating less work for both 
litigants and the courts so that they can begin to focus on the 
substantive historical requests and the grand jury materials’ effect on 
the present-day understanding of history. 
In sum, the longstanding rule of grand jury secrecy must remain 
intact. At the same time, grand jury records of prodigious historical 
significance must be accessible to historians for the benefit of 
democratic change and scholarly debate. The proposed historical 
exception harmonizes these two notions by establishing a uniform 
methodology for disclosure among district courts. Where secrecy no 
longer serves its purpose, and where historians can profoundly impact 
academia or democracy, grand jury records “should languish on 
archival shelves, behind locked doors, no longer.”178 
 
 178. In re Am. Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
